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PREFACE 
The use of thirq-party payments to finance health care is 
pervasive throughout the United States. There increasingly is talk of 
some form of a national health plan. No study has been conducted to 
test the effects of differing rates of return, or payback ratios, of 
health insurance policies on the demand for hospital services. It is 
the purpose of this ~tudy to make such a test. The methodology employed 
uses multiple regression analysis to test for statistical significance 
and double-logqrithmic regressions to estimate the respective demand 
elasticities. 
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this study and to my graduate education. I am very grateful to the 
members of my qdvisory committee. Professor Gerald Lage provided 
extremely valu~ble help in the earliest stages in clearly formulating 
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suggestions in the later stages of the study. The chairman of the 
committee, Professor Joseph Jadlow, provided invaluable assistance 
through his encouragement, interest, and prompt and knowledgeable 
guidanceo 
In addition, I would like to thank all of the faculty of the 
Department of Economics for making my graduate education a rewarding 
and stimulating experience. Special thanks go to Professors Richard 
Leftwich, Frank Steindl, and 'Michael Edgmand. 
I would also like to thank Robert Crosslin, who made available 
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to me the basic data on health insurance policies and suggested the 
topic as a possibility. Further thanks go to Sharon Hair for typing 
the final copy. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family. To my parents, Herbert 
and Elsa Engelmann, whose heritage, sacrifice, understanding, and 
constant encouragement made all of my education possible go my deepest 
thanks. To my wife, Sue, and daughter, Stacy, go thanks for the 
encouragement and optimism they have provided and for the source of 
inspiration they have been in the completion of this study. 
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CHAPTER I 
. INTRODUCTION 
The health insurance industry within the United States has 
recently received increasing attention in the Congress. Since the late 
l960 1 s numerous legislative proposals to establish a program of 
national health insurance have been made. These include programs of 
mandatory insurance by employers through private insurance carriers, 
health insurance programs financed and administered either totally or 
partially by the federal government, and programs calling for the 
federal government to pay, on a progressive basis, a portion of the 
private health insurance premiums of the populace. 1 
State legislatures are also becoming more involved in health 
insurance, California, following the recommendation of former HEW 
Secretary John Gardner, recently issued minimum standards of coverage 
(benefits) which must be included in any health insurance policy sold 
in that state. 2 This type of action has since been repeated in other 
states. 
The impet4s behjnd these legislative proposals and actions is the 
increasing cost of hospital care, both in dollar terms and as a 
111 National Health Insurance Proposals Pending in the 93rd 
Congress,.• The Congressional Digest, LIII (June-July,.l974), p. 168. 
211 California Issues Minimum Standards for Health Ihsurance, .. 
Modern Hospital, CXIX (December, 1972), p. 42, 
percentage of Gross National Product. The consumer price index shows 
a 69.8 percent increase in the price of medical care for July, 1975 
over the base year of 1967 as compared with a 62.3 percent average 
increase for all items. 3 As a percentage of Gross National Product, 
hospital expenditures have risen from .631 percent of GNP in 1929 to 
1.299 percent in 1950 to 2.927 percent in 1974. 4 
While these costs have been rising, growing numbers of people 
have turned to private groups to finance these costs through some form 
of insurance. The Office of Research and Statistics of the Social 
Security Administration estimates that 78 percent of the populace 
under 65 had hospital care insurance in 1973, as opposed to only 72.3 
5 ( percent in 1962. The Health Insurance Association of America, which 
traditionally has higher estimates, arrived at a 90.9 percent figure 
for 1973. 6) These insurance policies are written by several groups. 
For those under 65, Blue Cross - Blue Shield has 36.2 percent of all 
policies; private insurance companies' group policies account for 37.1 
percent; private insurance companies' individual policies account for 
22.6 percent; and independent plans write 4.1 percent of all policies. 
3u. S. Department:of Commerce, Survey.of Current Business, LV 
(August, 1975), p. S-80 
2 
4oata ~n GNP was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, LXI 
(May, 1975), p. A-54. Data on toU:ll hospital care expenditures are from 
Nancy L. Worthington, 11 National Health Expenditures, 1929-1974, 11 Social 
Security Bulletin, XXXVIII (February, 1975), p. 13. 
5Marjorie Smith Mueller, 11 Private Health Insurance in 1973: A 
Review of Coverage, Enrollment, and Financial Experience, 11 Social 
Security Bulletin, XXXVIII (February, 1975), p. 27. 
6Ibid,, p. 24. 
Insurance cc;>mpanies are required, by law, to keep information 
regarding benefit'expenditures.and.premium.income for each type of 
plan. The ratio of ~enefit expenditures to premium income is referred 
to by those in t~e insurance industry as a 1.1loss ratio, 11 in that it 
3 
indicates the amount of each dollar.received in the form of premiums 
which is 11 lost 11 to the company as.a benefit.paid out to policyholders.? 
However, it would seem that a more appropriate term would be 11 payback 
ratio, 11 since, to that group of policyholders, it indicates how much 
of a dollar in premiums is .11 paid back 11 in the form of benefits. Hence, 
the term 11 paybqck ratio 11 is used .throughout this dissertation. 
The variation in payback ratios by.type of plan is substantial. 
Table I shows the payback ratios on various types of existing insurance 
•, 
plans in 1971 for the United States as a whole. 
The decision to enter the hospital is not really different from 
the decision to purchase any other good or serviceo The individual 
simply considers the effective cost (price) of entering the hospital 
vis-a-vis the prices of other goods and services and, given his utility 
function at th~~t point in time, arrives at a· conclusion. If hospital 
care were a 11 free good, 11 an indiv.idual would consider solely his state 
of health in his dec~sion on whether or not to enter the hospital. 
Economic factors would .play no role at all; that is, the values of 
these economic varialt!"es would not be statistically different from zero 
as determinants of th~ demand for hospital services. 8 In fact, several 
7Mark R. Greene, Risk.and Insurance (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1968), 
PP• 141-142o ----
8This, of course, assumes no multicollinearity between economic 
variables and those affecting one 1s level of health, as well as a 
correct specification of the model. 
4 
authorities have sug~ested t~at the price.of.hospital services is 
unimportant in this decis.ion.,.making process •. Klarman interprets a 
study by Paul J. Feldstein and Ruth M. Severson as demonstrating 
perfect price inelasticity of demand. 9 Others suggest that price and 
income do affect medical expenditures. 10 
TABLE I 
PAYBACK RATIOS ON VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE, 1971 
(Dollar Amounts.in Millions) 
B.enefi ts Premiums 
Type of Plan Received* Paid* 
Blue Cross ·~ Blue Shi~ld $8 '178. 7- $8,790.2 
Private Insurance Companies 
Group Policies 7,408.0 7 '724 .0 
Individual Policies 1,111.0 2,038.0 
Independent Plqns 
Community 508.0 536.6 
Employer-Employee-Union 611.0 638.5 
Private Group Clinic 14.4 17.8 
Denta 1 Society 60.0 75.0 
Payback 
Ratio 
.9304 
.9591 
.5451 
.9467 
.9569 
.8090 
.8000 
*Source: Mc(rjorie Smith Mueller, 11 Private Health Insurance in 1971: 
Services, Enrollment, and Finances, 11 Social Security Bulletin, 
XXXVI (February, 1973), p. 15. 
9Herbert E. Klarman, The Economics of Health (New York, 1965), 
p. 25. 
1°Kenneth J. Arrow, 11 Uncertainty and the W.elfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 11 American Economic Review, LIII .(.December, 1963), p. 950. 
Before any of the proposed legislation is acted upon, it would be 
beneficial to know to what extent economic factors affect the demand 
for hospital s~ryices. Several of the plans would involve compulsory 
health insurance furnished either by the employer or the government. 
It is plausible that in either situation the payback ratio would be 
affected, as these plans effectively eliminate certain barriers (such 
5 
as cost or failure to belong to a group which has a group health 
insurance policy) which currently deprive certain people from obtaining 
health insurance policies with relatively high payback ratios 
(essentially group policies). 11 . Therefore, in order to estimate 
accurately the change in demand, one must know the effect the payback 
ratio and other factors have on the demand for hospital services. It is 
the purpose of this dissertation to ascertain the magnitudes of these 
effects. 
Chapter II reviews past attempts to analyze the demand for hospital 
services. It illustrates, both graphically and mathematically, how 
differing payback ratios can be expected to lead to differing quantities 
demanded of hospital services. 
Chapter III presents the theoretical model used in the empirical 
analysis. Justification of the included independent and dependent 
variables is given. 
Chapter IV discusses econometric problems encountered in the study. 
The empirical results obtained through multiple regression analysis are 
11 For example, Somers and Somers found that the share of the 
premium dollar retained by the insurance company within group policies 
varied from 30.6¢ for groups of 100 people to 5.5¢ for groups of 10,000 
people. See Herman Somers and Anne R. Somers, Doctors, Patients, and 
Health Insurance (Washington, D~C., 1961), p. 270. 
presented and analyzed for both inpatient and outpatient demand. The 
payback ratio is found to.be.statistically different from zero. 
Chapter V summarizes the entire study. 
6 
The empirical findings of this study generally support the hypoth-
esis that higher payqack ratios, working through both price and income 
effects, are associated with higher levels of demand for hospital 
services. It also concludes that outpatient demand reacts more signifi-
cantly with ecqnomic variables than does inpatient demand. 
- CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with past attempts to measure the demand for 
hospital services. Specific variables included in these earlier studies 
are examined and shortcomings of these studies are discussed. Then a 
theoretical justification for the inclusion of the payback ratio as an 
·independent variable is developed graphically and mathematically. 
The survey of the literature in this chapter is not intended to be 
exhaustive. Instead, those studies are presented which illustrate 
techniques of measurement, dependent and independent variables, and 
models relevant to this study. A more complete listing of past attempts 
to measure the demand for hospital services is found in the bibliography. 
Examination of the Literature 
Numerous researchers have attempted to specify and estimate models 
of the demand for health services. This section considers a selected 
few of these prior attempts. 
Martin S. Feldstein in his doctoral dissertation at Oxford 
University1 stUdied the British National Health Service. In his stUdy, 
1Martin S. Feldstein, .Economic-Analysis for Health Service 
Efficiency (Amsterdam, 1967). 
7 
using 1962 data from.hospitals in.the.area.surrounding Oxford, he 
analyzed the determinants of hospital .admissions and length of stay. 
The study was limited to maternity cases. 2 He found that the decision 
' 
8 
to enter the hospita,l was determined by age, number of.previous 
children, past obstetr.iG history, social class, availability of beds, 
and marital status. 3 Feldstein reported no regression coefficients, 
instead reporting only the percentage deviation in admission probabilty 
for each regression. 4 As the entire population of his study was 
covered by the National Health Service, he did not include economic 
variables (price, in~ome) in his analysis. Hence, the importance of 
Feldstein•s st~dy is its use of admissions as a measure of quantity 
demanded. 
Paul J. Feldstein and W. John Carr examined the effect of income 
on medical care spending by the private sector of the economy. 5 Ten 
sets of data were used in a cross-section.analysis ranging from 1917-
1919 to 1960-1961.. They began by running simple regressions of medical 
care expenditures on family income. However, they used only the means 
of each of the ten data sets. Using double-logarithmic regressions, 
the income elasticities ranged from 0.496 (1941) to 0.957 (1935-36). 
The most recent data (1960) yielded an income elasticity of 0.683. 6 
2Ibid., p. 241. 
3rbid. 
4Ibid., p. 244. 
5Paul J. Feldstein and W. John Carr, 11 The Effect of Income on 
Medical Care Spending, 11 American Statistical Association: Proceedings 
of the Sec-ial Science Section (191iif), pp. 93-105. 
6Ibid., p. 95. 
9 
However, they felt additional regressors that were left out might have 
biased upward the elq.sticity estimate, Therefore they next included 
family size, age of head of family, education of head of family, number 
of family memb~rs gainfully employed, insurance expenditures, and 
percent of families insured. 7 Further, in order to eliminate the 
effects of transitory income and more closely approximate permanent 
' 
income, they grouped the data by city, believing that the transitory 
components might ave:rage out to zero for each city. Income elasticity 
estimates were 1.065 for 19508 and 0.433 for 1960. 9 No price elasti-
cities were computed. 
It is noteworthy that the Feldstein and Carr study included health 
in~urance expenditures in the second series of regressions. They 
apparently reasoned implicitly that this would be a suitable proxy for 
coverage, which is in reality the desired variable. Yet, if sig,nificant 
differences in payback ratios occur, this would be a false assumption. 
In one of the most frequently cited studies, Paul J. Feldstein and 
Ruth M. Severson10 used cross-section analysis employing multiple 
regression on data collected by the Health Information Foundation and 
the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. These 
data were collected across the United States civilian non-institutional 
7Ibid,, pp, 99-100, 
8Ibid., p, 99, 
9Ibid.' p, 100. 
10Paul J. Feldstein and Ruth M. Severson, "The Demand for Medical 
Care, 11 Report of the Commission on the Cost of Medical Care, Vol. I 
(Chicago: American Medical Association, 1964}, pp. 57-76. 
10 
population in July, .1953 and the summer, 1958. Information collected 
included the amount spent on medical care, extent of insurance coverage, 
age, urbanization, family size and family type, and income. 
The study estimated the price elasticity of demand for physician 
visits at -0. 19; that for gross physician expenditures at 0.02; and 
that for hospital admissions at Q.lloll Toerber, however, reports that 
this is not consistent with experience under the Medicare program where 
it has been found that hospital utilization by those eligible to 
receive free hospitalization increased 23 percent. 12 Feldstein and 
Severson later note that 11 •• o a 10 percent increase in the proportion 
of the bill paid by insurance would lead to an increase of 4.8 percent 
in hospital expenditures, 4.5 percent in hospital admissions, and 2.5 
percent in patient days. 1113 In addition, they noted that these results 
are probably biased downwards. 14 
In 1970 Hyman Joseph utilized cross-section data to determine the 
effects of third-party payment on length of stay in hospitals for 22 
separate illne~ses or conditions. 15 The study was conducted to test a 
11 Ibid.' pp. 66-67. 
12Garry A. Toerber, An Evaluative Analysis of Medical Care 
Financing Systems with Particular Emphasis on~ National Health 
Insurance, Graduate Program in Hospital and Health Administration, 
Health Care Research Series No. 20 (Iowa City, Iowa: University of 
Iowa, 1972), p. 63. 
13Paul J. Feldsteinand Ruth M. Severson, p. 67. 
14In estimating the price variable, Feldstein and Severson used 
an average unit price for all families when no other price variable 
could be found. 
15Hyman Joseph, 11 Hospital Insurance and Moral Hazard, 11 Journal of 
Human Resources, VII (Spring, 1972), pp. 152-161. 
11 
phenomenon called 11 moral hazard.11 In insurance literature, moral 
hazard is an increase in usage.of hospital services as a result of the 
lowering of hospital costs to the user through insurance. Mark V. 
Pauly16 has argued that this phenomenon depends upon.rational economic 
behavior and the presence of a nonzero price elasticity of demand. 17 
In the study Joseph found the price elasticities of demand to be 
11 generally low, 11 with estimates of more than one (i.e., elastic demand) 
in only two of the 22 categories. Joseph felt, however, that the price 
elasticity estimates were biased downwards due to the method of 
recording the data used in the study. 18 
Karen Davis and Louise Russell studied the demand for outpatient 
care and the substitutability of outpatient care for inpatient care. 19 
They used a multiplicative model with statewide data for their 
regressions. The data on visits.was taken from the 1970 Guide Issue 
of Hospitals. Inpatient price was measured by (1) inpatient revenue 
, per patient da~, (2) inpatient revenue per admission, and (3) the basic 
20 
charge for a two-bed room. In addition, they measured the effect 
16Mark V. Pauly, 11 The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 11 
American Economic Review, LVIII (June, 1968), .pp. 531-537. 
17 rt should be obvious that if hospital usage were determined 
solely by medical fqGtors, then the price elasticity of demand for 
hospital services wo~ld be zero. 
18Hyman Joseph, p. 160. 
I 
' 19Karen Davis and Louise B. Russell, 11The Substitution of Hospital 
Outpatient Care for Inpatient Care, 11 Review of Economics and Statistics, 
LIV (May, 1972), pp. 109-120. 
20Ibid., p. 112. 
12 
of the price of hospital.outpatient care.on.inpatient demand .. Inpatient 
demand was measured.by admissions. and length of stay .. In.this study 
they found that the outpatient price vp.riable.wp.s.significant at the 
0.01 level with an elasticity of 0.25. They further.found that the 
cross elasticity of inpatient price with respect.to outpatient care is 
four times as high as that for outpatient price with respect to 
inpatient care. This simply means that a- percentage change in the 
price of inpatient care has a greater effect on outpatient visits than 
the same percentage change in the cost of. outpatient care has on 
. t" t d 0 • 21 1npa 1en a m1~s1ons. 
Of further note is the effect of inpatient price and income on 
inpatient demand. When inpatient price is measured by inpatient 
revenue per patient qay, the results are not statistically significant. 
I 
However, when inpatient price is measured by inpatient revenue per 
admission, the variable is significant at the 0.01 level and has an 
elasticity of .. 0.32. They also found that the signs associated with 
the insurance variable were positive, indicating an increase in 
insurance coverage leads.to.an.increase in.hospital admissions. The 
2 22 
reported R •s ranged from .72 to .80. 
The final studies to be considered are those conducted by Gerald 
D. Rosenthal. In the first of these Rosenthal hypothesized that the 
demand for hospital services .(measured by patient days per 1000 
population, admissions per 1000 population, and average length of stayf3 
21 Ibido' p, 115. 
22 Ibido 
23Gerald D. Rosenthal, The Demand for General Hospital Facilities 
(Chicago, 1964), Po 34o 
was a function of price, income, insurance coverage, .age, marital 
status, sex, urbani~ation, education, race, .and family size. Price 
was measured by the mean charge for a two~bed room. Units of observa~ 
tion were the individual states. Rosenthal tested both an additive 
model and a multiplicative model in his analysis using least~squares 
multiple regression. R2•s of from 0.5473 to 0.7971 (corrected R2•s 
of from 0.3742 to 0.7195) were obtained from the additive mode1. 24 
13 
The multiplicative model yielded R2•s pf from 0.4826 to 0.7643-
(c~rrett~d R21 s of from 0.2847 to 0.6742). 25 Rosenthal found the price 
variable to be significant at the 0.1 level for the 1950 data and 
significant at the 0.05 level for the 1960 data. 26 All tests were made 
using a one~tailed t~test. Negative signs were associated with the 
price regression coefficient. .With respect to the two income variables, 
although a positive sign was obtained in eleven of the twelve 
opportunities, only three of the eleven were statistically significant 
at the 0.05 leve1. 27 The insurance coverage variable showed the 
correct sign and was statistically significant at the 0.05 level for 
the 1960 data. However, for 1950 the coefficients had the proper sign 
in only two of the three runs, and neither was statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. Rosenthal attributed this to a broadening of 
24 Ibid., p. 35. 
25 Ibid., p. 95. 
26 Ibid., p. 40. 
27 Ibid., p. 35. 
14 
. d . th . t ' d d 28 Wh 1nsurance scope.an coverage 1n e.1n erven1ng eca e.. en 
comparing the 1950 data ta.that of.l960, Rosenthal "concluded that 11 the 
impact of economic variables on utilization of"hospital services was 
such that the role of consumer choice was significantly greater in 
1960 than it had been in 1950 ... 29 
The other Rosenthal .study.was conducted with data gathered in the 
New England area. 30 By taking data on l ,112,058 admissions in 68 
hospitals for 1~62, he was able to subdivide the individual observa-
tions into 28 ~roups~ each homogeneous with respect to age, sex, and 
diagnosis. 31 The hypothesis tested within each group was that demand 
was a function of price. Demand was measured by length of stay. Price 
was measured by (1) cash payments as a percentage of the patient•s 
total bill, anq (?)the average room charge. R2•s ranged from 0.0119 
to 0.5590. Rosenthal found that average room charge fared better than 
., 
did cash/total bill, being statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
in eleven of the 28 groups. 32 Having used a multiplicative model 
(i.e., double-lo~arithmic), the coefficients were also elasticity 
estimates. Using daily room charge as price, elasticity estimates for 
28Ibid., p. 41. 
29 Ibid., p. 43. 
30Gerald Rosenthal, ~'Price Elasticity of Demand for Short-Term 
General Hospital Services, .. in Herbert E. Klarman (ed.), Empirical 
Studies in Health Economics (Baltimore, 1970)., .pp .. l0hll7. 
31 Ibid., p. 105. 
32 Ibid., pp, 110-lll. 
over half of the categories were over 0.2.and significant at the 0.05 
leve1. 33 
Fuchs criticized.this.study.on.several counts. 34 Specifically, 
15 
·' ·•· Fuchs felt that length of stay was not a sufficient estimate of demand 
but only one· dimension of.it .. Secondly,.Fuchs argued that the two 
price variables 11 do not measure price or anything even resembling 
-'price . ., .. 35 Fuchs concluded by arguing for the inclusion of such 
traditional variables as income, education, etc. in the mode1. 36 
In summary, admissions was used as a measure of quantity demanded 
in theM. S. Feldstein, the Davis and Russell, and the first Rosenthal 
study. Cross-~ection analysis was frequently used. All of the studies 
except the one by Martin Feldstein used double-logarithmic models to 
estimate the d~mand for hospital services. Further, independent 
' 
variables such as age, race, sex, income, urbanization, and insurance 
coverage were generally included in these studies. 
A Theoretical Illustration of the Economic 
Effects .of.the Payback Ratio 
While some research has included insurance coverage as an independ-
ent variable in the demand for hospital services, any concept analogous 
to the payback ratio is absent. This section considers some possible 
34victor R. Fuchs, 11 Comment, 11 in Herbert E. Klarman (ed.), 
Empirical Studies ill Health Economics, pp. 118-120 .. 
35 Ibid., p. 119. 
36 Ibid, p. 120. 
16 
causes of differences in payback ratios-and.the effects these 
differing payb~ck ratios .can .have on the .quantity of .hospital services 
demanded. Four basic situations.are analyzed: .. (1) .policies of 
identical covera~~s but.different costs; .(2).policies.af.identical 
cost but different coverages; .(3) policies of identical cost but 
different·'deduotiple amounts; and. (4) policies ._which pay different 
percentages of the e¥penses~ .. Each.of these situations is then con-
sidered with indifference curves .to illustrate how different payback 
ratios would be expected to be associated with different quantities 
of hospital se~vices demanded. 
The effect of health insurance on the demand for hospital services 
must be considered, for the ownership of insurance will change the 
individual •s perception of the price of hospital .services. The 
economic effect of hospital insurance is to alter the shape of the line 
of attainable combinations. Consider Figure 1. Line segment AB 
represents the line of attainable combinations before any hospital 
insurance is oqtaineq. The purchase of hospital insurance will have 
the effect of shifting the line of attainable combinations to a new 
position, such as EKLM .. This assumes: (l).tbe policy cost the 
individual amount AE; (2) the first OJ dollars of medical care must be 
paid for by the patient.(Le., as a.deductible); (3) KL (=JV) hospital 
services are entirely paid by the pol icy; and. (4)_ beyond point L (or V) 
all additional hospital care must be paid entirely by the patient; 
there is no aoditio~al reimbursement. 
Consider q second policy. It is assumed that the deductibles, 
coverage, etc. are identical to the first policy. The only difference 
between the two policies is premium cost, with the second policy having 
Ill Ill 
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Figure 1. The Effects of Differing Prices on the Line of 
Attainable Combinations 
17 
Hr· 
a cost of AF. Since.coverages.and deductibles are identical, and for 
the individual probapility of disease does not change with respect to 
which policy is purchased,.it must.be concluded that the second policy 
will have a lower expected.payback ratio than.did.the first policy for 
that individual, assuming that hospital services are not an inferior 
good. 
Assume a third policy,. This policy is furnished ,at no cost to 
the individual -- it is a 11free good. 11 Assuming the same deductibles 
and coverages, the line of attainable combinations for this policy will 
be AGHD. 
Now consi~er the individual as having purchased hospital care so 
as to exhaust the benefits under any of the three policies (i.e., to 
have purchased more than OV hospital care). It is now possible to 
i 
arrive at some conclusions regarding the respective payback ratios. 
Since the thirq poliGY cost the individual nothing, but could pay 
benefits of JV~ the payback.ratio for the policy is undefined (but its 
limit approaches infinity). For policies one and two, it is obvious 
that they diff~r only.in.premium cost. Since expected benefits 
received are the same, it can therefore be concluded that the first 
policy had a higher payback.ratio than did the second policy inasmuch 
as the premiums paid were different, but the expected benefits received 
! 
are identical. 
The difference is premium cost is one obvious source of differences 
in payback ratios. It is not the only source; numerous others exist. 
Some of the more obvious ones will be illustrated. 
Consider two policies that have the same premium ~ost, same 
deductibles, same diseases covered, but one policy gives higher dollar 
19 
benefit limits for each disease or treatment category. This is shown 
in Figure 2. Line AB is the line of attainable-combinations with no 
insurance purchase. Assume the cost of either policy is AE. The 
deductible of either policy is OJ. The line of.attainable combinations 
for the policy with the lower benefit limits is EKLM and for the policy 
with the higher dollar benefit limits is EKST. If any individual were 
confronted with the purchase of.OV hospital services, it is obvious 
that the payback ratio associated with that policy having line of 
attainable combinations EKST would be higher than the payback ratio for 
the other policy (KN/AE versus KL/AE). 
Another obvious source of differences in payback ratios is that 
of differing deductibles. If these policies were identical in cost and 
coverages (for both dollars and condition or treatment) but one had no 
deductible while the other required the patient to pay the first X 
dollars before the insurance company began its benefits, it would be 
expected that a lower payback ratio would be associated with the latter 
of these two policies. Consider Figure 3. AB is the original line of 
attainable comqinations; AE is the cost of either policy. Either· 
policy pays a total of ED (= JV = KL) benefits. Note, however, that if 
only ON hospital services.are required to complete a given treatment, 
then the payback ratio.associated with.the policy with no deductible 
would be ED/AE = ON/AE, while that for the policy with OJ deductible 
would be KM/AE = JN/AE, a lower payback ratio. 
In all of the above cases (with the possible exception of Figure 3), 
the differences in payback ratios are illustrated by parallel shifts of 
the line of attainable combinations. This is analogous to a change in 
income; the higher the payback ratio, the larger the change in real 
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Figure 3. The Effects of Differing Deductibles on the Line 
of Attainable Combinations 
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income vis-a~vis a lQwer payback.ratio.{and the.greater the differences 
in payback ratios between.two.policies,.the greater.the differences in 
real income, cijteris paribus) .. Hence, .if hospital services are a 
normal good in the.tradi.t.ional.economic.sense of.the.term, it would be 
expected that larger quantities.of hospital services would be purchased 
.. 
given higher p~yback ratios.vis ... a ... vis.lower.payback ratios. 
i 
But these are not the only sources of variation in payback ratios. 
Consider two policies of.identical costs. Neither policy is assumed to 
have any deductible associated with it. The first policy yields line of 
attainable combinations EDM in Figure 4, signifying maximum benefits 
of ED= OV. T~e secqnd policy requires the purchaser to pay some 
portion of the costs of treatment ·(e.g., 20 percent) but wi 11 pay up to 
a larger dollar amount of hospital services OW, yielding a line of 
attainable combinations ECM. It is obvious that for any individual 
purchasing at least QW hospital services the payback ratios of these 
two policies are the same, since ~he premium costs of the policies are 
I 
the same and.,. beyond C.,. the lines of attainable combinations are 
identical, Th~t is, since incomes are.the same, .. the amounts paid for 
the policies are the same, the quantities of.hospital services consumed 
are the same, qnd the amount left over for the consumption of all 
other goods an~ services (CW) is the same, it must be that the insurance 
companies paid the same amounts for the hospital services. 
Consider~ third policy of costAE, but one which requires the 
patient to pay a still Jarger portion of his hospital costs (e.g., 25 
percent). The sl6pe of the line of attainable combinations will be 
steeper (i.e., have a greater negative value) than E€, such as EF. 
These are non-parallel shifts of the line of ~ttainable combinations. 
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This is a price effect ... The-steeper slope indicates a higher perceived 
price for hospital services for the insured. Whether or not the pay-
back ratio is ~Hher, lower, or.the.same depends on.the quantity of 
hospital services consumed by.the patient .. For the payback ratio of 
the third policy to have the potential .of being.the same or greater, 
the line of attainable combinations for this.tbir.d policy would have 
to extend to or past DM .. If the.li~e of attainable combinations is 
EFG, it can be concluded that the expected payback ratio will neces-
sarily be lower than that of either of the first two policies. If the 
line of attainable combinations is ELM, and at least OP hospital 
services are consumed, the expected payback ratios of all these policies 
are identical; if less than OP hospital services are consumed, the 
expected payback ratios of the other two policies will exceed the pay-
back ratio of this policy. If more than OP hospital services are 
consumed, and the line of attainable combinations for this policy is 
EJK, then this policy will have the highest payback ratio of the three. 
In any of these examples, the actual quantity of hospital services 
consumed by the individual depends upon the tangency of the appropriate 
r indifference curve with.the respective line of attainable combinations. 
The various possibilities will now be considered. 
The indifference curves in the following diagrams are based on the 
assumption that the ·individual receives no satisfaction from hospital 
care beyond that which. is .required for his treatment. 37 It is further 
37However, the individual is still willing to trade off some 
hospital care for other goods and services -- perhaps forgoing the 
last day in the hospital should it not be covered in the policy (with 
the consent of his phys.ician), or stay in a semi-private instead of a 
private room. 
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assumed that this required level of treatment is finite and known to 
the physician, given.the state of health of the patient. Thus the 
indifference c~rves for a given patient with a given condition will all 
attain a zero slope at the same.level.of hospital services. However, 
the indifference curves are not.necessarily vertically.parallel at 
quantities less than this amount. Were.the indifference curves 
vertically parallel throughout, this would imply that additional income 
resulted in no incr~ase in hospital services demanded. Past research 
shows that this clearly is not the case. 
Consider Figure 5, (This is simply Figure 1 with the inclusion 
of indifferent curves.) Two basic possibilities exist. Should less 
than OV (say, OW) be the maximum hospital services required for his 
treatment, the individual will consume exactly the same quantity of 
services under either policy (shown by the tangencies of indifference 
curves I and II with the appropriate lines of attainable combinations). 
In this case, the differing payback ratios cause no change in the 
quantities of hospital services demanded. 38 
Consider a second (different) situation in which the patient 
requires more services than.the policy provides -- i.e., more than OV 
services, Again, using normally-shaped (i.e., characterized by a 
declining marginal rate of substitution) indifference curves (I' and 
II'), note that now q. larger quantity of hospital services is demanded 
under the policy with a higher payback ratio (OY versus OX), due to 
38should the individual in fact receive positive utility simply 
from remaining in the hospital past the time required for treatment of 
his illness or condition, he can consume OV hospital services under 
either policy and still experience no loss of other goods and services. 
However, this would require the consent of the admitting physician. 
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the greater real income associated with.the.fir.st p6licy. 39 
Figure 6 is Figure 2.with the addition of indifference curves. 
The analysis is the ~arne as in Figure 5. Curve I shows that, when 
less than OV hqspit&l-services are consumed, the policies are virtually 
identical and ~ence the same quantity of hospital services (OQ) is 
consumed. However, if more.than OV services are required, the policy 
. with the higher payb!ilck ratio (EKST) leads to a larger quantity (OU) 
of hospital service~.being consumed than with the other policy (OR). 
Figure 7 sho~s the effects of differing deductibles. The policy 
with no deductibles (and.a higher.expected payback ratio), EDM, leads 
to the consumption of OY hospital services, while the holder of the 
other policy demands only OX hospital services. Beyond quantity OV, 
the two polici~s would yield identical solutions. 
The indifference curve analysis for Figure 8, which shows the 
possibility of price effects, is simplified over the possibilities 
included in Fi~ure 4. Assume a policy which pays all costs up to OV 
hospital care, and a second policy which pays only a percentage of 
those costs but up to a la\rer amount (OW). If less than OV services 
are required, it is probable that a larger quantity of hospital 
services would _be chosen under the first policy (OQ versus ON), which 
would have a higher expected payback ratio at that quantity of hospital 
services. This is logical. Under.the first policy, inasmuch as each 
additional unit of hospital services is free (out to OV units), it 
waul d be expected that a 1 arger quantity ·of hospita 1 services waul d be 
39Although OC would be consumed were hospital services provided 
at no charge, the aforementioned trade off between hospital ·services 
and all other goods and services now occurs, 
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demanded than when the patient is required to pay.a portion of each 
dollar of hospital services ... However, at.quantities beyond OV but 
less than OW the situation changes. Now, the holder of the first 
policy must pay in toto for each additional ,dollar of services beyond 
OV, whereas thet second policy continues to pay a majority of the 
additional cost. Hence, under.the first policy OV is demanded, while 
under the secorjd policy OP is demanded. In both of these cases price 
effects are evident. 
One important source of variation in payback ratios must still be 
considered. It c9.nnot be neatly.portrayed as can those above in 
graphical form, yet H cannot-be overlooked. This is the possibility 
that benefits may be more difficult to collect from certain insurance 
companies,1 or p~rhaps from certain.types of policies written by these 
. . 
companies. Even though price, .coverage, 1 deductibles, etc. are all the 
same for similQ.r policies of two separate companies .. (assuming identical 
claims), one cqmpany may have a.lower payback ratio simply because of 
refusal to pay claims via some pretext (unless pushed), slower handling 
of claims (thereby allowing the company more time to hold the premium 
before paying it out), or a refusal to pay items of a questionable 
1 nature whereas other companies pay the~as a matter of policy. Many 
more of these non-quantifiable types exist; their importance is an 
., 
empirical question. 
An altern4tive ~eans of showing that differing payback ratios can 
alter the p~ic~.of hqspital ,services as .perceived by the individual can 
be shown mathematically. Consider the utility function 
U = u(Y, H) ( 1 ) 
where U is utility, Y is income, and H is hospital services consumed. 
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The consumer has total income Yt. A portion of that is used to 
purchase hospital insurance, leaving the consumer with income Yn This 
insurance in turn pays a portion of his hospital costs so that 
k = P /P 
c m 
where k is the portion of price (per unit) which the consumer must 
(2) 
pay, Pm is the per unit price of the hospital service, and Pc is the 
price to the consumer (out-of-pocket price), The out-of-pocket 
expenditures (Ep) for the group covered by the policy are then 
E = k ( P · M) = P (M) = kE ( 3) p m c t 
where M is the quantity of hospital services consumed and Et is total 
expenditures on hospital services for the group. Then 
Et = Ep + B ( 4) 
where B is the total benefits paid by the insurance company. Dividing 
through by Et gives 
Et E B 
- = __£_ + - or 
Et Et Et' 
l = kEt + Et - Ep 
Et Et 
E - E 
- k = t p 
Et 
Dividing (4) by premiums paid (N) gives 
Et = E + B 
- __£_ - or N N N' 
Et = .:_p_ + R, 
N N 
where R is the payback ratio. By linking (4) and (7) one obtains 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
( 1 0) 
.·'; 
Therefore 
kP 
m 
PC = 
1.-k-=R.~. 
t 
k = 1 - R(~ ) 
t 
= p ( 1 R N 
-
. r) m t . 
pm (1 R N . -) Et 
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( 11) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
( 14) 
It can now be easily seen that the greater the value of R (the 
payback ratio)~ the lower the net price of hospital services to the 
consumer, ceteris paribus. Assume.N/Et equals one. If.R = .5, the net 
price to the cqnsumer is .5 Pm. If R = .9.(a higher payback ratio), 
the net price falls to .1 P . 40 If.hospital services.are characterized 
m 
by a negatively sloped demand curve, then a decrease in the price 
perceived by the consumer should read to an increase in the quantity of 
hospital services demanded. 
The effect of differences in the payback ratio on quantity demanded 
'·:is then an empirical question. The model to be tested is given in 
Chapter III. The empirical findings are presented and discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
Summary 
This chapter has.reviewed prior attempts to estimate the demand 
for hospital services .as well as other writings that pertain to the 
40should N/E be less than one, it merely reduces the decrease in 
the net price ~iv~n an increase in the payback ratio. For example, had 
N/E~ equaled o~ly 0.5 in the example, the out-of-pocket price to the 
consumer would have beeD .75 P with.a payback ratio of.0.5 and .55 Pm 
with a payback ratio.of 0.9. Tn other words, .the smaller the percentage 
of premiums paid to total expenditures on hospital services, the smaller 
the effect of changes in the payback ratio on the price of hospital 
services to the policyholder. The direction of the change in price, 
however, does not change. 
hypothesis of this s~udy ... Although some past efforts have included 
insurance coverage as a.variable, .most.treat.it as.a homogeneous good 
when in fact significant.differences exi~. Theoretical .arguments 
34 
for the inclusion of the payback.ratio as an independent.variable have 
! 
been given, both graphically.and mathematically, .to.illustrate the 
possible types of effects.differing.payback ratios would be expected 
to have on the d•mand.for hospital services. 
. -CHAPTER I II 
.THE-METHODOLOGY OFTHE STUDY 
.. Introduction 
The indifference cur.ve analysis.and mathematical -demonstration 
given in Chapter II ~uggest that various factors can.cause differences 
in payback ratios, and that.these differences may result in differing 
quantities of hospital services being demanded, ceteris paribus. In 
this chapter tH~ basic methodology to be used in the statistical 
analysis of the effects of various factors, including the payback ratio, 
on the demand for hospital services is developed. The specific analyti-
cal models to be used are developed with consideration given to 
individual variables. The statistical .techniques for analysis of the 
data are considered. Finally, the sources of data for the study are 
given. 
The Theoretical Model 
In determining a theoretical model of.the demand for hospital 
services, one qverwhelming,variable immediately becomes evident--
illness or accident, thereby causing an immediate need for hospital 
services. In any given year, a majority of the people demand no 
hospital services because they remain healthy and, as a gene~l rule, 
healthy people do not demand hospital services (with the major exception 
of pregnant women). All other variables would seem to be secondary to 
35 
that of illnes~ or accident .. In-any.theoretical .model, certainly a 
variable showing an immediate need for.hospital services on the part 
of the individual would be included. However, .it.is obvious that in 
36 
any empirical undertaking this variable must be omitted. It is 
possible that~certain.demographic variables (e.g., age, .race) may well 
approximate some of this •.. For example, inasmuch as blacks are suscept-
ible to sickle-cell anemia whereas whites are not, blacks.may have a 
greater demand for hospital .services, ceteris paribus. Urbanization 
might be a factor in demand if, due to air of a poorer quality and less 
exercise the urban dweller finds himself more susceptible to certain 
diseases (e.g., lung cancer) than his rural counterpart. If heart 
disease is positively correlated with age, then those areas with a 
concentration of elderly people might experience greater demand for 
hospital services than would otherwise be expected. "But at best all of 
these are simply poor proxies for ascertaining the most important 
single variable, immediate need. 
where 
The general form of the theoretical model is: 
D. :::.d.(P .. , P ., Y., S., Pb.) 
n1 n1 01 1 1 1 
D 0 is the quantity of inpatient hospital services demanded per 
n1 
unit of time.for individual i, 
d is a functionql .relationship to,be specified, 
p 0 
nl 
is the price of inpatient hospital services for individual i ' 
p 
oi is the price of outpatient hospital services for individual i, 
1. is the inco~e per unit of time for individual ; ' 1 
s. 
1 
is a vector of demographic and social characteristics of 
individual i, and 
where 
Pbi is the.payback.ratio of.the insurance.policy owned by 
individual L 
Also considered.is.a.model of outpatient care 
D .. =.f (P ... , P .. ,. Y., S., Pb.) 01 . . . . 01 . m .. 1 1 1 
D . is the quantity.of.outpatient hospital services demanded per 01 
unit of time.by.individual i, 
f is a sp~cified functional relationship, and 
P01., P ., y., S., and Pb. are as defined above. n1 ., 1 1 
Each of these var.iables is considered in more detail in the 
following section. 
The Structure of the Empirical Model 
The basic data.are for the years 1970 .. 1971, and are given by 
37 
states,. Each specific variable is examined below and the expected 
signs~of the independent variables.are.discussed. An empirical evalua-
tion of the appropriateness of each variable is considered in Chapter 
IV, 
The quantity of hospital services demanded can be defined by several 
alternative measures. These are: .(1) admissions per.thousand popula-
tion; (2) total hospital inpatient days per.thousand.population; or 
(3) average length .of stay. 1 In addition, total outpatient visits per 
thousand population are used as a dependent variable to gain some 
measure of the substitutability.of outpatient care for inpatient care 
1These are all commonly accepted measures of the quantity of 
hospital services demanded. Refer to the literature discussed in 
Chapter II in the section Examination of the Literature. 
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through the use.of.price cross~elasticities .of demand. 
Price can be.defined.in.several different ways.- .Inpatient 
revenue per pa~ient.day,.inpatient.revenue per.admission» .and average 
room charge ar~-Q.ll ~ossible.measures .. of-the pr.i.ce of.. inpatient 
hospital servi¢es. It.is hypothesized that.the sign.of.the regression 
coefficient wil. l be negative with respect to inpatient demand for any 
of these price measures .. With respect.to outpatient demand, i~ is 
hypothesi zed that the sign of . the coefficient will be pas it i ve. 2 In 
1 
addition, outp4tient revenue per visit is used as the price variable 
' 
for outpatient:visit$. It is hypothesized that its ,sign will be 
positive with respect to demand.for inpatient services and negative for 
the demand for outpatient services .. 
The price variable used in this model is an average price. It is 
calculated ex post, as have been the price variables in the previously 
cited studies. L D. Taylor has pointed out.that such a demand calcula-
tion should use both-average and.marginal prices, and that these 
prices shouldcbe.taken from a.price schedule. 3 .However, as this 
!'i 
study uses statewide.aggregated.data, Taylor's suggestion ca:nnot be 
i,l 
followed, It is rot~d that the .marginal .price to the patient is 
probably less than the.average price in that the majority of patients 
I 
do not use up all 1 th~ir benefits. Thus the insurance company is still 
bearing a share of t~e cost .. The omission of a marginal price variable 
may then result in a bias in the price variable. 
2If so, this would indicate that the two goods are substitutes as 
opposed-to complements. 
3Lester D. Taylor, "The Demand for Electricity:. A Survey," 
The Bell Journal of Economics, .VI (Spring,. 1975), PP~ .78-79. 
The income variable, because the data are statewide, is simply 
the median income of all families in the state. It is hypothesized 
that its sign will be positive with respect to inpatient demand, 
indicating positive income elasticity of demand. With respect to 
outpatient demand, the expected sign is more difficult to determine. 
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At first glance one would expect a positive sign; however, it is 
possible that outpatient visits are an inferior good, which would 
indicate a negative relationship between demand for outpatient services 
and income. 
The variable dealing with age is specifically that percentage of 
a state•s population over 65. It is hypothesized that its coefficient 
will have a positive sign for both inpatient and outpatient demand, in 
that the older the population the .greater the probability of conditions 
requiring hospitalization, such as heart disease and cancer. 
It is theoretically possible that those of a very young age might 
require more hospital services than 11 normal, 11 thereby explaining some 
of the variation in quantities of hospital services demanded. Therefore 
the percentage of the state•s population under five is also considered 
as an independent variable. The expected sign of the coefficient 
would be positive. 
Race is expressed as that percentage of the state•s population 
which is Caucasian. Inasmuch as the Negro, American Indian, Mexican 
American, and other minority groups traditionally receive poorer 
prenatal care than do Caucasians and may even be subject to diseases 
that do not affect the white element of the population (e.g., sickle-
cell anemia), it is expected that there would be a negative relationship 
between the variable and the quantity of hospital services demanded, 
40 
both inpatient.and outp~tieht~ · 
Sex is included for.one.specific.reason. Women.have.babies, which 
in this cultur~ freq!Jently entails hospitalization •.. The .variable is 
expressed as m'les .per.hundred.females by.state .. It.is hypothesized 
that the sign ~f the coefficient will be negative.for inpatient demand. 
No specific hy~othesis is made regarding outpatient demand. 
Urbanization is defined as that percentage of the state's popula-
tion living within the confines of a standard metropolitan statistical 
area (SMSA) as defined.by the Department of Commerce. Some authorities 
argue that peowle who live near hospitals are more likely to use those 
.facilities than those who live in areas where there are-no.hospitals. 
If this hypothesis is correct, .the sign of the.variable should be 
positive for bQth inpatient and outpatient demand. In addition, it is 
possible that the environment in SMSA's.is of a poorer quality thereby 
leading to mor~ disease and a.greater demand for hospital services. 
This would reinforce the positive sign of the.coefficient. 
It might be argued that the SMSA designation is too narrow; that 
in fact hospitqls can be found in many smaller towns. Therefore, a 
second definiti'n of urbanization (that percentage of the state's 
population living in places with populations greater than 2,500) is 
considered to Rreclude this possibility, The hypotheses with respect 
to the signs of the coefficients would remain the same. 
and 
·where 
Therefore, the models to be tested empirically are 
·D = g.(P., P., Y, A, R, X, U~ C, Pb) 
n n o 
D .. ::;: . h . ( P . , P . , . Y, A, R, X, U, C, Pb) 
o o n 
D is the demand.for inpatient.hospital services, 
n 
Do is the demand for outpatient hospital services, 
p 
n 
is the price of inpatient.hospital .services, 
Po is the price of outpatient hospital services, 
y is income, 
A is age, 
R is race, 
X is sex, 
U is urbanization, 
C is the percentage of the population covered by hospital 
insurance, 
Pb is the paybac~ ratio, and 
g and h are functional relationships to be specified. 
Use of the least-squares regression model for analysis of demand 
had been justified by Wold and Jur~en. 4 Indeed, all of the studies 
citied in Chapter II use multiple regression analysis for obtaining 
their estimates. 
The form of the regression model may be either additive (linear) 
or multiplicative (log ... linear). An additive model is of the type 
D = a + bP + cP + dY + ... + nPb + e, 
n n o 
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where a, b, .. , n are the coefficients of the respective independent 
variables. A multiplicative model would be of the type 
D = a pS pY ycr • • 
n n o · 
where.s, y, cr, •.• ,n are all powers to which the respective variables 
4Herman Wold and Lars Jureen, Demand Analysis: A Study ..:i.D_ 
Econometrics.(New York, 1953), pp. 28-59. 
. I , 
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are raised .. This could be rewritten 
log Dn = log.a + s.log.P~ + y log P6 +a logY+ •.... + n log P~e. 
In other wordsj all that must be done is to enter the dependent and 
independent vari~bles as logarithms and the multiple regression model 
will compute the coefficients for the logged data. Hence it is also 
referred to as a log~linear model, since it is linear in the logarithms. 
Certain advantages accrue to the use of the log-linear model. One 
of these concerns the computation of elasticities of demand. It can be 
easily shown that the elasticities of the variables of an equation 
which is log~linear are simply.the coefficients of that log-linear 
t . 5 equa 1on . However, when using the additive model the elasticity 
. 'l}' . 
coefficient holds only for.a.small.segment about the.means of the 
respective variables. Hence the use of the.log~linear model avoids 
that criticism with respect to elasticities. Therefore, both models 
are tested. 6 
Statistical Techniques Employed 
As stated above, the basic statistical tool used in this study is 
that of multip1e linear regression .. Specifically, the stepwise regres-
sion procedure is used. The characteristics of this procedure are 
worthy of mention. 
5carl F. Christ, Econometric Models and Methods (New York, 1966), 
p. 79 0 
6The studies examined in Chapter II employed both linear and log-
linear models. Davis and Russell and both articles by Rosenthal used 
log-linear models. In addition, Rosenthal also tried an additive model 
in The Demand for General.Hospital Facilities .. The remaining authors 
gave no clues as to whether the model they tested was linear or log-
linear. 
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Regression.analysis.attempts.to.explain the extent to which 
certain independent variables react.with the dependent variable. In 
its simplest form, t~at of.linear regression with a single independent 
variable, the ~nalysis attempts.to fit.a straight line so that the sum 
of the squared deviations of the actual observations from that fitted 
line are a minimum. The R-square (R2) statistic is defined as the 
' variation expl&ined by the regression equation divided by the total 
variation of t~e dependent variable. 7 The remaining variation is 
'called 11 residuq.l. 11 The residual occurs because of (1) lack of fit of 
the tested mod~l (as opposed to what the true model would have achieved) 
... ~:·~. -, ' 
t!{;l,, 8 
and (2) pure· error (also called 11 noise 11 ). 
Just as impottant as R2, .however, is the sign and value of the 
coeffi ci en:t of the independent variable. Statis ti ca 1 techniques 
ascertain the probability that.the coefficient is.statistically differ-
ent than zero. (A.zero coefficient would indicate that there is no 
statisti~al relationship between the two variables.) Which of these 
properties is more important -- R2 or value and sign of the coefficient 
is indeterminate; it depends upon the problem at hand. 
In actual practice it is probable that several independent vari-
ables interact ~ith the dependent variable. This implies that for n 
independent variqbles, in actuality an n-dimensional figure is being 
· used from which the squared deviations of the observations from that 
figure are being measured. 
7Potluri. Rao and Roger.LeRoy Miller,.Applied Econometrics 
(Belmont, California, 1971), p. 14. 
8 N. R. Draper and H •. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York, 
1966), pp. 26-32. 
Given a good theoretical model, .it.is.not.always.clear exactly 
which variable~ should be included.and.wbich.omitted •.. This leads to 
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the problem of selecting the ubestu regression equation. Unfortunately, 
there exists no single 11 best 11 method for doing this; several choices 
exist, These include (1) all possible regressions, (2) backward 
elimination, (J) forward selection, (4) stepwise regression, and (5) 
stagewise regression, 9 Draper and Smith believe stepwise regression 
to be the best of these techniques and recommend its use. 10 As it is 
the statistical technique used in this study, a brief discussion of its 
nature and properties is in order, 
Stepwise regression involves a process in which the computer 
tries each regressor individually to ascertain which one is the 11 best 11 
single regressor-~ that is, causes the- greatest reduction in residual 
sum of~he squares (or.yields the greatest.R2). Having selected this 
regressor, it then tries all others in combination with it, selecting 
that one which brings about.the greatest total reduction in residual 
sum of the squares iry concert with it (or the greatest improvement in 
R2), It continues this pattern until.(l) all.regressors are included 
or (2) it reaches some predetermined minimum increase in R2, at which 
point it terminate~ the search. 
A major advantage of the stepwise regression technique is that 
the researcher can look for interaction between variables as they are 
introduced in the regression analysis .. For example, this may allow 
him to detect an indication of multicollinearity between certain 
9Ib1d., pp. 163-164, 
10Ibid,, p, 172. 
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variables .. By watching.the.individual.coefficients and the R2 
statistic, the researcher may also.be.able.to identify.more readily 
superfluous variables as well. 
Sources of Data 
The data for the dependent and independent variables in this 
study come from numerous sources, The primary.source of data regarding 
admissions, length of stay, .inpatient days, and outpatient visits by 
t t . th G . d I f H ... 't. 1 ll S , f. 11 t t . d d t s a e 1s e Ul e $SUe o . osp1 a s.. peel 1ca y, s a ew1 e a a 
was obtained for non~federal, short-term general and other special 
hospitals. These include.(l) .non~governmental not for profit, (2) for 
profit, and (3) stat~ and local governmental hospitals. Table 3 
provided information on admissions, average stay, and total outpatient 
visits. Table 8 gave data on gross inp'atient revenue, gross inpatient 
revenue per patient day, gross outpatient revenue, and gross outpatient 
revenue per patient visit. 
Data for the sociological and demographic variables were obtained 
from the 1970 U. S. Census of the Population. 12 The following 
variables for each state are found in various tables and charts within 
each state 8s vo1ume(s): 
11 until the 1971 data appeared, the Guide Issue was traditionally 
the second part of the August 1 edition of the magazine. However, 
beginning with the 1971 data, a separate volume was issued. Therefore 
the 1970 data were received from the August 1, 1971 Guide Issue of 
Hospitals. Th~ 1971 data are from Hospital.Statistics 1972 (Chicago, 
1973). 
12u. s. Bureau.of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970 
(Washington, D. C., 1972). 
1. popul~tion; 
2. urbanization (places.of 2,500 or more); 
3. urbanizatio~ (SMSA's); 
4. race, percentage white; 
5. sex, males per 100 females; 
6. age, percent under five; 
7. age, percent over 65; 
8. education, median school year.s~completed, those age 25 
and over; and 
9. income, median, all families in.the previous year. 
Data on numbers 'of persons covered .by hospital insurance by type 
of plan'by state were obtained from the Health ·Insurance In~titute. 13 
The information was converted to.percentage coverage by dividing the 
number·of persons covered by hospital insurance in a given state by 
that state•s population. 
The data qn premiums paid.and benefits were furnished by the 
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.Health Insurance Association of America. It is statewide data, broken 
down into four types of policies: (1) private companies• .group policies; 
(2) private companies• individual policies; (3) Blue Cross-Blue Shield; 
and (4) independent plans .. HIAA compiled the data obtained by their 
own survey, which drew responses from companies writing 85 percent of 
the hospital insurance premium volume. Data for those companies which 
failed to respond, or whose reports were incomplete, were estimated by 
HIAA from the premium volume of.those companies as published annually 
13Health Insurance Institute, .Source Book on Health Insurance 
Data, 73-.74 (New York, 1974), p. 20. ---
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in the May editian.of.Healtb.lnsur.ance Statistical .Review, published 
.. ,-;:· -·. '· •. -~:. i ·:·.~J.-' 
by National Underwriter. 
Summary 
In this chapter both.the theoretical model and the empirical 
model have been developed and discussed .. The individual regressors 
have been list.d. Expected signs of the coefficients were discussed. 
Attention was given to the statistical techniques used in the empirical 
' 
analysis, specifically.the use of the stepwise regression technique. 
Finally, the Vqrious sources of data used in the empirical study have 
been given. 
.CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
.Intropuction 
This chapter presents the statistical results and analysis of the 
models present~d in Chapter II .pert~ining to the.demand for hospital 
l 
services. The first section deals.with certain econometric problems, 
specifically that of multicollinear)ty. The sed5'nd section discusses 
the selection of the best measures of certain demographic and sociologi-
cal variables ~here choices exist. The third section presents the 
results of the linear and log-li~~ar regression models for the demand 
/' 
for inpatient hospita 1 services utili z,i ng two separate measures of 
inpatient demand. In the fourth section the results of the linear and 
log-linear regression.models for outpatient demand are discussed. The 
statistical re~ults are then analyzed. Comparisons .of the results of 
this study wit~ previous studies are made for both inpatient and out-
patient demand. Differences between the two models of inpatient 
.demand are analyzed. Finally, elasticity estimates for the economic 
variables are ~iven and their meanings discussed. 
Multicollinearity 
In considering the various ind~pendent variables used in the 
model, it might appear at first glance that certain pairs of these 
variables might be collinear; that is, they might be expected to move 
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together. Race and. income, .age .and income, urbanization and income, 
and education.qnd income are among.the possible.combinations of 
independent variables which might be expected to exhibit' colliriearity. 
To the extent th~t multicollinearity,exists, .it may.impair:-.the accuracy 
and stability of the parameter estimates. 1 Therefor-e, it was deemed 
essential to check for collinearity.in the analysis. 
The model~ tested use cr:-oss~section analysis. Multicollinearity 
tends to be a more pervasive problem in time~series analysis due to 
the tendency of economic variables to move together over time. 2 
However, it can be a problem in cross~section analysis as well. 
The first check made is a method based on Frisch's confluence 
analysis. 3 This method requires an elementary regression equation 
which appears to give plausible results. Then new independent variables 
are added and their effects.on individual coefficients, standard errors, 
and overall R2 are noted. Each variable is then classified as either 
useful, superfluous, or .detrimental. If the new variable improves R2 
without rendering other.coefficients.unacceptable on a priori grounds, 
it is considered useful. If it does not cause much change in R2 and 
does not considerably affect the.values of the individual coefficients, 
it is considered superfluous. Should.it affect the values of the 
coefficients, .it is considered detrimental. 4 Should the individual 
1A. Koutsoyiannis, Theory of .Econometrics (New York, 1973), p. 225. 
2Ibid., p. 226. 
3Ibid., pp. 230~231. 
4Koutsoyiannis (p. 231) warns that this does not mean that the 
detrimental variable should be rejected, as that would merely cause 
specification error. 
coefficients be affected in.such.a.way.as to become.unacceptable on a 
priori considerations,. ther:1 .multi col linearity may .be a. serious 
problem. 
Using this .technique with stepwise regressior:~,.the education 
variable was deemed superfluous .as.in general .it added about .002 to 
R2 withou~ causing any substar:~tial change.in the.individual coef-ficients 
or their standqrd errors. 
The second check made for mult'icollinearity is an examination of 
the correlation coefficients between the respective independent 
variables. These are given in Table 1 and are denoted r . x,y 
has argued that collinearity is harmful if 
Klein 
where r2 is the simple correlation coefficient between any two x.x. 
1 J 
explanatory variables .(x. and x.) and R2 
. 1 J y~ x1 , x2, . . . , xk is the 
overall (multiple) correlation coefficient of the relationship. 5 
Hence, a check of these.coefficients .. is in order. 
Some surprising.facts.are evident. First, no coefficient among 
the independent varig.bles.is.very large, the greatest being -.6lll2 
for age (percent over 65) and sex (males per 100 females). Squared, 
this is ,37347, cert~inly not large.in absolute terms. The negative 
relationship is to be expected, given the fact that women have longer 
5Lawrence R. Klein, .An Introduction to Econometrics (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp.64, 101. It is recognized that the simple 
correlation coefficient is usually expressed as rxiXj· However, by 
squaring this, problems associated with sign are eliminated as 
well as allowing comparison directly with the R2 statistic. 
Variables u A 
D;a -. 14891 .48062 
0id . 16012 -.08250 
D .51594 .01587 
0 
P. 1a .71269 -.00734 
pid .57506 -.36995 
p 
0 
.36060 -.19097 
IPBR -.32191 .28141 
NPBR -.02767 -.11112 
c. 1 -.46345 .39802 
en .38306 . 14044 
y 
.54975 -.37910 
R -. 24117 .37065 
s -. 38872 -.61112 
A -.04743 1. 00000 
u 1. 00000 
TABLE II 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
s R y 
-.41098 -.06653 -.41119 
-.61690 -.09174 -.21044 
-.33412 -.37957 .26356 
-.27919 -.07541 .67360 
. 12125 -.10236 . 72853 
.0255'3 .15606 .36060 
-.01644 .23276 -.37186 
.24004 .07468 -.08078 
-. 14020 .08318 -.53623 
-. 28713 .08035 .34009 
.22556 -.02501 1.00000 
. 01725 1. 00000 
1.00000 
en c. 1 NPBR 
-.13831 .43168 .02136 
. 16051 .27199 -.07746 
.44425 -.54995 -.17167 
.50842 -.58758 -.04819 
.28484 .69928 .05078 
. 13075 -.25825 .07177 
-.05603 .42622 -.12350 
-.40845 .02470 1. 00000 
-.40232 1.00000 
1.00000 
Variables IPBR Po 
D. 1a .41238 -.10693 
Did 013232 .00541 
Do -034726 -' 19949-
Pia -.39970 .48767 
pid -.44455 . 57124 
Po -.05960 1 ,00000 
IPBR 1 oOOOOO 
TABLE II (Continued) 
pid P. 1a 
-042163 -.26857 
-.20085 017459 
.39330 .53580 
• 77198 1.00000 
1.00000 
Do Did 
.06407 .74421 
. 31219 1 .00000 
1.00000 
D. 1a 
1. 00000 
(.]1 
N 
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life expectancies than me-rl,-- The next largest coefficient relates 
2 income and education at .56404 (r u, Y = .3l§J, ·_positive sign is 
as expected. The th1rd largest coefficient relates urbanization and 
income at .54975 (r2Y = .30223). Again, the sign is as expected. 
'e 
The only real surprise in Tableii is the coefficient relating 
race (percent ~hite) and income (median, all families) at -.02501. The 
sign is unexp'ected .. A look at the.individual observations reveals why 
this occurred. Washington, D. C .. is 27.7 percent white -- the lowest 
of any observation --yet has an above average median income ($9,583). 
Hawaii has the se~?nd lowest number of whites as a percentage of total 
population (38.8 percent) and has an even higher median income 
($11,554). Alqska is also well below the average number of whites at 
78.8 percent, but has the highest median income ($12,443). In neither 
of the latter two cases is the major non-white element black. However, 
no distinction is made in the data for blacks specifically. Hence the 
somewhat surprising sign of the coefficient can be understood in the 
light of these (and other) individual observations. 
The magnitude of this coefficient is so small (r2r, Y = .00063) 
that the variables are virtually orthogonal. This seems to be the 
case among many of the variables. 
As stated above, the largest r 2 .for any of the independent 
variables (age and sex) is 0.37347, and the smallest R2 for any 
estimated model is .55 .. In-accordance with Klein•s criterion, it 
appears that multicollinear-ity should not be a problem. 
Klein•s approach has been attacked by Farrar and Glauber. 6 They 
6oonald E. Farrar and Rebert G. Glauber 11 Multicollinearity in 
Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited,~ Review of Economics and 
Statistics, XLIX (February, 1967), p. 98. I 
point out several circumstances (eog., complete multicollinearity) 
that cause it to break downo. To rescue.the approach, they suggest 
comparing the overall multiple correlation coefficient R2yo 
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x1,x2, .. ,xn 
with the multiple correlation coefficient of each independent 
variable regressed on all other independent variables (R2 ) 
x1.x2,x3, .. ,xn. 
As a rule of thumb, Farrar and Glauber suggest that 
o , o a variable Xi then, would be said.to be 11 harmfully 
multicollinear 11 only if its multiple correlation with other 
members of the independent variable set, Rxo• were greater 
than the dependent variable 1s multiple corr~lation with 
the entire.set,·Ryo7 
The results of these additional regressions can be seen in Table 
III. Note that 11 high11 R2•s are computed for inpatient price, age, sex, 
and income, It seems especially plausible that age and sex should 
attain these high valueso Little can be done about the inpatient 
price and f~come variables, as these are central to the hypothesis of 
this thesiso Note that prior studies utilizing statewide data used 
these same variables and must have had similar resultso Age and sex 
must be included in the model for theoretical reasons and are always 
statistically significant in the determination of inpatient demand. 
Therefore, the results of this section are somewhat contradictoryo 
The test sugge~ted by Farrar and Glauber warns that multicollinearity 
might in fact impair.the accuracy and stability of the parameter 
estimates, Yet using Kle1n 1 s criterion, there should be no significant 
problem caused by rr~ulticollinearityo An analysis of the coefficients 
and their standard errors accomplished through the use of stepwise 
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TABLE III 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES' REGRESSIONS 
Variable Linear R2 Log-linear R2 
Inpatient Revenue 
per Admission .80676 .78809 
Outpatient Revenue 
per Visit .44080 .40120 
% over 65 .66810 .75884 
Race, % White .49601 .40102 
Sex, .Males per 
100 Females . 71935 .74710 
Urbanization, • 
% in SMSA' s .68777 . 34717 
Income ,79752 . 71862 
Individual 
Payback Ratio .40570 .46873 
Non-individual 
Payback Ratio ,29758 .25636 
% Covered with 
Individual Policies .58696 .61998 
% Covered with 
Non-individual Policies . 49113 .51039 
regression confirms this impression. Perhaps Rao and Miller are 
correct in their observation that multicollinearity 11may often be 
largely a theoretical nightmare rather than an empirical reality. 118 
Selection of Appropriate Variables 
As stated in Chapter III, several choices are available for both 
urbanization and age. Urbanization could be measured by either the 
percentage of the state 1 s population within geographic confines of an 
SMSA, or those living in places with .greater than 2,500 population. 
With respect to age, either those under five, those over 65, or a 
combination of the two (those under five or over 65) could be used. 
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Regressions of numerous models of the demand for hospital services 
were run changing only the urbanization variable between the two choices. 
Of these two, the percentage of the population within SMSA 1 s gave 
substantially better empirical results than did those living in places 
with greater than 2,500 population. Therefore,.the former variable was 
deemed a better definition of urban~zation for the purposes of this 
study and was 4sed in the regressions presented in the following 
sections. 
The percentage of the state 1 S population under five never appeared 
to be a significant factor in the demand for hospital services, whereas 
the percentage 9f the state 1 s population over 65 is extremely important 
in the demand for inpatient hospital services. Therefore, the age 
variable was limited to that portion of the state 1 S population over 65 
in all reported models. 
8Potluri Rao and Roger LeRoy Miller, Applied Econometrics 
(Belmont, California, 1971), p. 48. 
Depending upon.the regression.used, several other i~dependent 
variables orginally chosen were foundto.be relat.ivEilly unimportant in 
explaining the demand for hospital services .. These are considered 
later in this chapter. 
Multiple Regression Results: Estimation of the 
Demand for Inpatient Hospital Services 
As stated in Chapter III, the basic model to be tested is 
D 0 = f (Po , P , Pb 0 , Pbn, . . . ) 1 1 0 1 
where Pbi is the p~yback ratio on individual policies, Pbn is the 
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payback ratio qn non-individual policies (e.g., Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield, group plans), and the other variables are.as previously 
defined. Two measures of the quantity of inpatient hospital services 
demanded are considered: (l) inpatient hospital admissions per 1000 
population, and (2) total hospital inpatient days per 1000 population. 
Both measures ~re used. 
In addition, as previously mentioned numerous models of the demand 
function itself are possible. A linear (additive) model and a log-
linear (multiplicative) model are.both tried. 
Consider the additive model using admissions per 1000 population 
as the dependent variable. The results given by.the regression are: 9 
9In the following equations, the numbers in parentheses below the 
coefficients are t-values. If the variable is significantly different 
from zero using the one-tailed t-test at the .1 level, the t-value is 
followed by one asterisk; at the ,05 level, by two asterisks; at the 
.01 level, by three asterisks. If the predicted sign of the coefficient 
differs from the estimated sign, .the predicted sign is placed in 
parentheses above the estimated.sign. A.summary of all the regression 
results listed in this chapter is in the Appendix. 
D. = 270.06711 .~ .07035 P .. + 2.15150.P .. + 98.13491 Pb. 1a . . 1a o . . 1 
(1.83810)** (1.75522)~*. (2.33379)** 
+ 97.65575 Pb - . 13310 C. - .05486 C + .00461 Y + 5.29432 A n 1 n 
(1.59202)* (.43054) (.23206) (1.15733) (2.37857)** 
(+) 
- .77214 R- 2.52733 S - . 22827 U. 2 R = .552 R = 4.37690 
(2.95061)*** (2.43508)*** (1.30376) 
Note that race and sex are statistically significant at the .01 
level, while a~e, the individual payback ratio, inpatient price, and 
outpatient price are all significant at the .05 level. The non-
individual payback ratio is significant at the .1 level. The entire 
equation is significant at the .0005 level. 
' 
Several things immediately stand out. First, the payback ratios 
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have the expected signs and their regression coefficients are signifi-
cantly different from zero.(observed significance levels of .0117 for 
the individual payback ratio and .0578 for the non~individual payback 
ratio):tfi This gives empirical support to the hypothesis being tested. 
Secondly, the regression coefficient of the inpatient price variable, 
although small at .07, also exhibits the proper sign and is statistically 
significant at the .05 level. While the R2 statistic is not absolutely 
high, it must be remembered that the most important variable, immediate 
need, could not be included. Indeed, this level of R2 is very much in 
keeping with the r~sults of other studies utilizing statewide data. 
It is noteworthy that the income coefficient, while displaying the 
correct sign, is extremely small. and has an observed significance level 
of only .1265. This is discussed further in this chapter. 
10observed significance levels are determined by the computer. 
They give the exact level ef confidence at which the coefficient 
becomes statistically different from zero. 
The urbanization coefficient deserves some comment, .. in that it 
displays a sign contrary to that which is expected. 11 When examining 
the urbanization coefficient and its partial F .. value in the stepwise 
regression procedure~ it becomes evident that there is interaction 
between it and the income variable. This interaction apparently 
markedly changed the value of the coefficient. 
The additive model using.total hospital inpatient days per 1000 
population as the dependent variable yields the following results: 
Did= 1577.74514- 3.70388 Pid + 24.52555 P0 + 161.50385 Pbi 
(1.08725) (1.97209)** (.39105) 
+ 666.74681_ Pbn + .65247 Ci + ~.52378 Cn + .04119 Y + 77.08266 A 
(Ll2892) (.20467) {o67456) (1.17192) (3.69418)*** 
(+) 2 
- 8.15899 R- 16.85844.5-1.25035 U. R = .605 F = 5.43673 
(3.69418)*** (1.74976)** (.72780) 
This model yields substantially different results than did the 
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model using admissions per thousand population as the dependent variable 
(all independent variables are identical). While the overall R2 and 
F-statistic are slightly higher for this equation, the economic 
variables (with the exception of the price of outpatient services) are 
never significant at the .l level or better. All economic variables 
do exhibit the expected sign. 
A log-linear model is also tested using the same dependent and 
independent variables as above. 12 Using the log.of inpatient hospital 
11 wh11e this ~ign is unexpected, 1t is certainly not unique to ihe 
findings of this study. Gerald Rosenthal in The Demand for General 
Hospital Facilities also found a negative sign for the urbanization 
coefficient, as did Feldstein and Severson in 11 The Demand for Medical 
Care. 11 
12All data were put in.the form of natural logarithms. 
admissions per 1000 population as .the dependent.variable yields the 
following results: 
log o1a = log 9.31782 - .2883l log Pia + .20631 log P0 
(2.17308)** (2.32937)** 
+ .21886 log Pb1. + .57472 log Pb + .02832 log c. + .01463 log C n 1 n 
(2.02814)** (2.00714)** (.78180) (.13725) 
+ .17694 log Y + .34945 log A - .30952 log R - .84488 log S 
(1.08584) . (3.39422)*** .. (3.83480)*** (1.43227)* 
(~).01997 log U. R2 = .704 F = 8.43588 
(1. 80890) 
The results when the log of total hospital inpatient days per 
1000 population is used as .the dependent variable.in a log-linear 
model are: 
log Did= log 8.25104- .16976 log Pid + .21175 log P0 
(.67763) .(1.55247)* 
(~).03467 log pbi + .45907 log pbn + .05832 log c, + .14284 log en 
(.21983) (1.11138) (1.00233) (.92539) 
+ .13371 logY+ .56918 log A- .35739 log R- .60207 logS 
(.60844) (3.70637)*** (3.05866)*** (.71754) 
+ .00972 log U. R2 = .696 F = 8.13352 
( 0 59941) 
As explained in Chapter III, the coefficients of the independent 
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variables in t~e log ... linear models are the elasticity measures of those 
variables with respect to the dependent variable. Using admissions 
per 1000 population as the dependent variable, this gives a price 
elasticity of demand of -.29 and an income elasticity of demand of .18. 
(The income coefficient is.not significant at the .1 level.) The cross-
elasticity of demand of outpatient pri.ce with respect to admissions is 
.21. Using total hospital inpatient days per 1000 population as the 
demand measure yields a price elasticity of demand of -.17, an income 
elasticity of.demand.of .. l3, and.a cross-elasticity.of demand of out-
patient price of .21. (Neither the price nor the-income coefficient 
in the inpatient days model is significant at the .1 level.) 
Multiple Regression Results: Estimation of the 
Demand for Outpatient Hospital Services 
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In general, the.model for estimating outpatient.demand explains a 
larger percentage of the total variation about the mean than the model 
for inpatient demand achieves .. This may be explained by the fact that 
outpatient hospital services are, as a general rule, less urgent than 
inpatient hospital services. These services are more readily postponed 
or avoided altogether than inpatient hospital services. In addition, 
there exists tDe possibility of substituting a visit to the office of 
one's physician to accomplish the treatment. In short, the immediate 
need spoken of in Chapter II is probably less evident in the case of 
outpatient dem4nd than in the case of inpatient demand. 
It seems likely that the payback ratio should have little impact 
on the demand for outpatient hospital services. The data tend to 
support this conclusion. Consider the following results for the 
additive model: 
D0 = 2313.84115>- 36.25988 P0 + .25246 Pia + 204.15561 Pbi 
(4.06971)*** (.90755) (.66796) 
+ 152.50693 P · '~'8.56610 C. + 1.13849 C + .05196 Y + 20.46931 A 
(.34205}- b~ (3.81217)*1* (.66254)n (1.79563)** (1.26519) 
- 6.31954 R- 1~.63724 S- .17394 U. R2 = .770 F = 11.86038 
(3.32237)*** (2.07281)**- (.13668) 
The entire equation is significant at the .0001 level. 
Using a multiplicative model the following results are obtained: 
log D =log 19.66419 ~ .84865 log.P0 .+ .27237 log P. o . . . 1a 
(5.58408)*** .(1.19637) 
+ .05687 log Pbi + .08227 log Pbn - .23361 log Ci + .17016 log Cn 
(.30715) . (.16744) (3.75878)*** (.93044) 
+ .54705 log Y - .04243 .log A - .18564 log R - 3.66366 Jog S 
(1.95639)** (.24020). (1.34041)* (3.61949)*** 
- .00888 log U. 
(. 46872) 
2 R = .815 F = 15.59610 
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Again, since the coefficients of the variables of the log-linear 
model are the elasticity estimates of those variables, the analysis 
yields a price elasticity of demand of.-.85, an income elasticity of 
demand of .54, and a cross-elasticity of demand of i.npatient price of 
.27. (The inpatient price variable is not significant at the .1 level.) 
Outpatient price, individual .coverage, and sex are all significant at 
the .01 level; income is significant at the .05 level, and race is 
significant at the .1 level. 
Interpretation and Implications of the Empirical 
... Results: .Inpatient Demand 
The regre~si9n.equations presented earlier in this chapter 
provide support for .the hypothesis of this study, .that higher payback 
ratios are associated.with.larger quantities of hospital services 
demanded. The use of admissions.per 1000 population as.the dependent 
variable provides more support for the hypothesis than does the use of 
total hospital inpatient days.per 1000 population. The reasons for 
this are discussed below. 
Consider the first model presented using admissions per 1000 
population as the dependent variable in a linear model. As mentioned 
in this chapter, race and.sex are significant at the .01 level, with 
age having an observed significance level of .0106. These variables, 
which may well be the best proxies available for need, continually 
achieve these high levels.of.s1gn1ficance in the demand for inpatient 
hospital services, 
The economic variables display the correct signs.and generally 
achieve accept~ble levels of.significance, .Specifically,.inpatient 
price is significant at the .0352 level, income at the .1265 level, 
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the individual payback ratio at the .0117 level, and the non-individual 
payback ratio qt the .0579 level.· Note the great similarity of the 
coefficients for the individual payback ratio (98,13491) and the non-
individual payback ratio (97.65575). The overall R2 is .552, and the 
F-statistic of 4.37690 is .significant at the .0005 level. 
When using total hospital inpatient days per 1000 population as 
the measure of quantity demanded, the results change.significantly. 
While the demo~raphic and sociological variables retain their importance 
(age and race are significant-at the .. 01 level, .while sex is signifi-
cant at the .05 level), .the economic factors (inpatient.price, the 
payback ratios, and.income) are no longer significant at the .1 level 
or better. 
The coefficients of.the payback ratios are much larger in the 
inpatient days model (161.50385 and 666.74681 for the individual and 
non-individual payback ratios respectively). As total hospital 
inpatient days is equal to admissions times average length of stay 
(typically about 7.5 days) one wou-ld expect that the coefficients for 
all the independent variables would be larger in absolute value in the 
inpatient days model as opposed to the admissions model. In fact, the 
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absolute value of every.coefficiemt in.the inpat.ienLdays model is 
greater than.the cpefficient.for.the respective.variable in the model 
using admissions as the dependent variable~ The intercept for inpatient 
days ( 1577.74514) . is . about. six .. times. that. for. the admissions mode 1 
(270.06711). This makes sense g.iven.the average length of stay. Note, 
however, that with regard.to.the payback ratio the standard errors of 
these coefficients are so large that serious doubt.is.cast on the 
validity of these estimates, 
As mentioned above, the economic variables differ greatly in their 
levels of significance between the two models of inpatient demand, It 
would seem that some discussion is in order to explain why economic 
variables are statistically important in explaining hospital admissions 
but so seemingly un1mportant.in explaining total hospital inpatient 
days. The answer must.lie in.the person charged with making the 
respective decisions. The decision to ga.in admission to the hospital is 
made by the patient. The physician advises him, but.the decision is 
his. He can jijdge t~e.various economic factors ~~.price, income, 
insurance coverage~ .. in c:oncert with his physician•s .recommendations 
and arrive at a decision on whether or.not to utilize the hospital •s 
facilities. Once admitted, the patient relinquishes this decision-
making role, placing it in the hands of the attending physician. 
Society, the hospitals, or the physicians themselves have deemed the 
physician a better judge of when the patient is ready for dismissal. 
The physician can consider medical factors. (possibly along with his 
own utility function) in making this decision, Certainly these afore-
mentioned economic factors play a smaller role in the physician•s 
decision than they would were the patient himself making the 
decision. 13 Hence the difference in the importance of. these economic 
factors betwee~ th!i!Se two .. mode 1 s occurs. 
In the log~linear model .using.admissions, .age and.race are both 
significant at the .01 .level.. The. individuaL payback ratio has an 
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observed significance leveLof .0234, tbe non.,.individual payback ratio 
of .0245, and inpatient revenue per admission of .0169 .. Outpatient 
revenue per visit has an observed significance level of .0119. Sex is 
statistically significant at the .1 level. In short, the economic 
variables are in fact statistically different from zero under generally 
accepted criteria. 
Using inpatient days as the dependent variable in a log~linear 
model again sharply reduces the statistical importance of the various 
economic variables, as it did in the linear model. 14 The observed 
significance level (one..,tail test) for the individual payback ratio 
goes to .4109; for the non ... individual payback ratio, .1363; and for 
inpatient revenue per patient day, .2545 .. Only outpatient revenue per 
visit retains statistical significance at better than the .1 level with 
an observed si~nificance level of .0650. As mentioned above, age and 
race are again significant at.the .01 l.evel. 
The coefficients of the log..,linear modelsrare important in that 
they are elasticity estimates .. Using admissions as tbe dependent 
13This is most vividly.seen in long.,.term patients with terminal 
illnesses, who sometimes request the cessation of certain life-
sustaining treatments in order to avoid depleting the financial 
resources and placing their survivors in a precarious financial position. 
14The sole difference in the data was the necessity of entering 
0.1 instead of 0.0 as the percent.of the state's population within 
SMSA's for Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming, as .the computer cannot 
accept the natural log of zero. 
variable gives an.incorne.elasticity.of.demand.of .• l77.and.a price 
elasticity of ..... 288 .. (The.income.coefficier:~t.is.not.s.igr:~ificant at 
the .1 leveL) This compares with Davis and Russell's estimates of 
22 d 19 f · d . . · ·t·•· 1 15 F ld t. d 
-. an .. , or 1ncome an pnce respec 1ve y. .. .e s e1n an 
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Severson found elasticity estimates of .,.,7629 for income and .1102 for 
. 16 pr1 ce. 
The payback ratios used in.this study had coefficients of .219 
and .575 in the admissions model .. The implication of the data in this 
study is that a 10 percent ir:~crease in the payback ratio would be 
associated with a 2.to 6.percent increase.in hospital admissions per 
1000 population, while a.lO percent increase in income would be 
associated with somewhat less than a 2 percent-increase 'in h6sp~tal 
admissions per 1000 population .. A 10 percent increase in price wquld, 
ceteris paribus, be associated with about a.3 percent decrease in 
hospital admissions per.lOOO population. 
Additional runs were.rnade omitting.the payback ratio to see if 
this would significantly alter either the income or price coefficients. 
No significant changes in the coefficients occurred, .although in the 
models using admissions per.lOOO population as the dependent variable 
overall R2 fell from .552 to .472 in the linear estimation and from 
15Karen Davis and Louise B. Russell, p. 114. 
16Paul J. Feldstein and Ruth M. Severson, p. 67. The negative 
sign associated with income in both studies and the positive sign 
associated with price in the Feldstein-Severson study make absolutely 
no sense from an economist~s point of.view. Feldstein and Severson 
(p. 67) and Davis and.Russell .(p .. 116) both suggest the negative sign 
of the income variable to be caused by multicollinearity between income 
and other variables; Feldstein and Severson suggest insurance, Davis 
and Russell inpatient price~ Feldstein and Severson do not specifically 
comment on the sign.of the.price variable. 
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.704 to .. 648 in.the log~linear.estimation. 
Age, race, and.sex.have.the.expected signs.in.all .models of 
inpatient demand and.are.generally significant.at.the.;Ol level. 17 The 
age coefficients in the.log~linear.estimations.indicate that a 10 
percent increase in:the portion of.a.state 1 s population over 65 would 
increase hospital ad!)lissions by.3.5 percent and total .hospital 
inpatient days by 5. 7 percent. Similarly, the race coefficients show 
that a 10 percent increase in the portion of the state 1s population 
which is white would be associated with a 3.1 percent reduction in 
admissions and a 3.6 percent reduction in inpatient days. The 
coefficients of the sex.variable.indicate that a 10 percent increase in 
males per 100 females would be associated with an 8.4 percent reduction 
in hospital admissions and a 6 percent reduction in total hospital 
inpatient days. The reasons.for.the expected directions of these 
results have been discussed in Chapter III. 
The 1nsur~nce coverage variables have the expected (positive) 
sign, but their values .are extremely small in the admissions model. 
This especially stands.out when compared to the values of the payback 
ratios. 
Interpretation and Implications of the Empirical 
Results: Outpatient Demand 
The estimated models of outpatient demand reveal some distinct 
departures from the results of the inpatient demand models. First, 
17Exceptions to.this.are found for age in the linear admissions 
model (observed significance level of .0106) and for sex in both log-
linear estimations. 
the age coefficients fall dramatically.in.statistical .significance 
(observed significance levels.of .1055 and .4033).and.value (20.47 
and -.042 in the linear.and.log~linear estimations respectively). 
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This compares ~ith observed significance levels of .0106, .0010, .0012, 
and .0005 and coefficients of 5.29, .349, .77.08, and .569 for the linear 
admissions, lo~.,lineq.r admissions., .linear inpatient.days, and log-linear 
inpatient days models respectively. An obvious explanation is that 
many conditions afflicting those over 65 require hospitalization; 
there is little statistical .evidence. in the data showing.them to have 
a significantly greater number.of conditions which are treated in 
outpatient status than.does .the rest of tbe population. This same 
deemphasis of ~ociological.and.demographic variables continues through 
the race and urbaniz~tion.variables as well. 
This deemphasis does .not.contir:JUe through sex. The sex coeffi-
cients of -15.64 and -3.66 (significant at the .0212 and .0006 levels 
J6 respectively) for the linear.and.log-linear models is not much of a 
change from the direction established for inpatient demand. The 
coefficient of the sex variable in the log-linear model is interpreted 
as meaning that.if males per 100 females fell by 10 percent, total 
hospital outpatient visits would rise by 36.6 percent-- a rather sharp 
increase. The only apparent explanation lies in the prenatal examina-
tions many such,-facilities offer and which are.used exclusively by 
female patients. 
The second main.area.of departure occurs between outpatient demand 
and the inpatient days model. It.is a reemphasis of the price and 
income variables. This is most vividly seen in the outpatient price 
variable, Its value is -36,26 in the linear model and -.849 in the 
log~linear model •. While demand.for.outpatient.hospital services is 
still price inelastic, the coefficient of.~.849 indicates that a 10 
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percent increase in the.price of.an.outpatient.visit.would be 
associated with a decrease of.8.5 percent in quantity demanded. This 
is comparable with Davis ar:~d Russen•s .findings of a price elasticity 
of -1.00. 18 In addition, the income variable.also plays a more signi-
ficant role, h~ying coefficier:~ts of .05 and .547 with.observed 
significance levels of .0384 and .0273 for linear and log-linear 
estimations. ~gain, this indicates that a 10 percent increase in 
income would be associated with.a 5.5 percent increase in outpatient 
visits per.lOOO population .. This .is .considerably more elastic than 
the elasticity estimate for admissions (.177) or for inpatient days 
(a 134). The cr~ss-elasticilty of.demand.with.respect.to inpatient 
price is estimated at :272. 
In short, the demand for.outpatient visits reacts with price and 
income in a more aggresive.manner than does the demand for inpatient 
hospital services. The reason for this must lie in the nature of the 
services proviqed·. A list of those factors invariably used in 
principles textbooks to explain what goods would be expected to have 
price elastic demand and.vice-versa inevitably includes necessity 
versus luxury. While most outpatient.visits could.in no way be 
regarded as a 1 uxury, neither are. they generally as much a necessity 
as are those treatments accomplished on inpatients. Hence, while out-
patient demand is .still .price inelastic, it is substantially less price 
inelastic than is inpatient demand for hospital services. 
18Karen Davis and Louise Bo Russell, pp. 112, 116. 
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Summary 
Chapter IV.has dealt with the statistical .and.econometric problems 
which exist in this .and.similar.studies. An attempt.has been made to 
meet these problems, Multicollinearity was.discussed. The results 
were somewhat mixed, with.certain key.variables.(e.g.,.price, income, 
age, and sex) being potential .problems. The selection of specific 
definitions of certain independent variables was made with appropriate 
reasons given, The results of the various .regressions on both 
inpatient and outpatient demand, .using both linear and log-linear 
models, were presented .. These empirical .results were.analyzed and 
discussed. Suggestions have been made to account.for the differing 
results in the 9ifferent models of inpatient demand .. Central to this 
discussion were the reasons for the significant differences between the 
admissions model and the inpatient days model in both linear and log-
linear estimations. The coefficients of the specific variables have 
been analyzed. Finally, the outpatient demand model has been discussed, 
its coefficients analyzed and interpreted. 
.CHAPTER V 
.SUMMARY./:\ND.CONCLUSIONS 
The results of. this .. study show. that. the demand .for hospital 
sefvi ces . is. partially. determined. by. economic factors. .. It does not 
suffer from the unexpected results of either the Davis ... Russell study 
(negative income elasticity) .or.the Feldstein .. severson study (negative 
income elasticity and positive price.elasticity) .alluded to in Chapter 
IV. While certain demographic and sociological variables (specifically 
age, race, and.sex) explain.a~large portion of.the variation in 
statewide demand for inpatient hospital services, economic variables 
(price and payba~k rotios) are also statistically important in account-
ing for this v~riation. 
Insurance has the effect.of.altering the line of attainable 
combinations a~ well as the price.of hospital.services as perceived by 
the patient .. However,.insurance policies are not homogeneous goods. 
One way of sho~ing.ti:Je.differences between them is with the payback 
ratio. The empirical results of this study support the hypothesis that 
higher payback ratios.are.associated.with greater quantities of 
hospital servi~es demanded, due.to both income.and price effects. 
Models of outpatient demand were also tested .. They showed varia-
tions between insurance policies to be much less important in explaining 
variations between states. Further, age was found to be much less 
significant as a factor in the demand for outpatient visits. The 
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elasticities of.both income and price are.greater.for.outpatient 
demand than.for· inpatient demand. 
As federal.legislation.comes .about, .it.would.seem probable that 
certain minimum standards .of.performance.will .be.placed upon either 
the private companies writing.the.policies or on.the federal agencies 
involved. The attainment of.these.standards.would.be.most likely 
verified by either the GAO or by the various state insurance commis-
sions. As the program will be comprehensive, it seems plausible to 
assume that for those.holding individual policies, the payback ratios 
72 
of their 11 policies 11 under the new program would certainly rise, due in 
part to economies of scale .. Hence, for this group, the data indicates 
an increase in the quantity.of hospital services demanded will occur. 
Whether or not.the.payback.ratio will be greater than, equal to, or 
less than that currently existing for those holding group policies is 
purely conject~ral. Certainly.the direct benefits of such legislation 
among those currently holding hospital. insurance .will be greatest among 
that segment of policyholders owning individual .policies. 
Data show.that.the.likelihood of.owning hospital insurance is 
directly related to income. Whereas in 1970 90.1 .percent of all persons 
in families with 1ncomes.of.$10,000.or more had hospital insurance 
coverage, only 39.9 percent of those in families .with.incomes of less 
1 than $3,000 were ~o covered .. There are no statistics available on the 
incomes of tho$e holding individual .policies as.opposed to those holding 
group policies. However, it would.seem obvious that the individual 
1u. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Medical Care 
Ex enditures, Prices and Costs: .Background Handbook (Washington,----o-=-c., 
1973 ' p. 83. 
policyholder is one who cannot obtain a group policy, either because 
of discrimination or cost. They may be below.the median level of 
income; given this criterion; they are probably.disproportionately 
aged or non-white. As .most .1 arge. companies genera.lly. pro vi de group 
hospital insurance as a fringe benefit.and tend to be located in 
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urban areas, it would seem that a.disproportionate number of them would 
be from rural areas, 2 
Hence this study shows.that.price is a determinant of demand. 
Those legislative proposals which effectively do away with the price 
variable are essentially eliminating one measure of control of quantity 
demanded. While it may seem humanitarian to argue that everyone should 
receive all the medical care one needs, this effectively ignores 
reality, with its problems of scarcity of resources, Inasmuch as age, 
race, and sex cannot'be effectively controlled as determinants of 
-
1 demand by the legislative authority, one of the few controls left is 
·•-,price. 
Suggestions .for further research in this area primarily involve 
the acquisitiort of data on.a.disaggregated basis .. While the data on 
·:payback ratios ·are the best.currently.available, it would be beneficial 
to look at individuals.as.the.unit.of observation rather than states. 
The disaggregation would hopefully separate the demand for hospital 
services for different.illnesses and conditions .. This would necessarily 
be a large undertaking in order to.get a sufficient sample size. 
2Although farm cooperatives and simi 1 ar groups wi 11 frequently 
set up group policies for their members, those unable to afford the 
coverage are still effectively closed out. 
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APPENDIXES 
SUMMARY OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Model 
Variables D. Did log Dia log Did D log D0 · 1a 0 
Intercept 270.06711 1577.74514 9.31782 8.25104 2313.84115 19.66419 
P. 1a -.07035** -.28832** .25246 . 27237 
pid --3.70388 -.16976 
Po 2.15150** 24.52555** .20631** . 21175* -36.25988*** -.84865*** 
pb 0 
. 1 98.13491** 161.50385 .21886** -.03467 204.15561 .. 05687 
Pbn 97.65575* 666.74681 .57472** .45907 152.50693 .08227 
c. 
1 
-.13310 .65247 .02832 .05832 -8.56610*** -.23361*** 
c -.05486 1 . 52378 .01463 014284 1.13849 0 17016 
n 
y 
.00461 . 04119 . 17694 . 13371 .05196** .54705** 
A 5.29432** 77.08266*** .34945*** .56918*** 20.46931 -.04243 
R -.77214*** -8.15899*** -.30952*** -.35739*** -6.31954*** -. 18564* 
s -2.52733*** -16.85844** -.84488* -.60207 -15.63724** -3.66366*** 
u -.22827 -1.25035 -.01997 .00972 -.17394 -.00888 
00 
0 
The coefficients on the preceding page are taken from the 
regression results analyzed and presented in Chapter IV. Whenever 
the model is logarithmic, the variables are also logged. As is the 
practice in Chapter IV,.any.coefficient that is.significant at the 
.1 level is followed by a single asterisk;. if significant at the .05 
level, it is followed by two asterisks; and if significant at the .01 
level, it is followed by three asterisks. 
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